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When a web server is under a distributed denial of service 
(DDoS) attack, thousands or even millions of requests are made 
to the server in a short period of time. This prevents the server 
from operating normally, and most of the normal users cannot 
be served. In order to survive this type of attack, web servers 
have to be able to identify and filter out those requests made 
by attackers. In this thesis, we will leverage the power of some 
recently proposed high-dimensional data analysis tools to de-
sign an anomaly detection scheme which can help web servers 
to identify abnormal requests by learning the website access be-
havior of legitimate users under normal situations. 
Web access logs (sometimes referred to as the server logs) con-
tain various information including user identities, request type, 
website traversal paths and timestamps. After data cleaning 
and pre-processing, the access logs can be converted to traversal 
sequences, such that each sequence represents the access history 
of a particular user. A large number of essential attributes can 
be extracted from these traversal sequences. For example, the 
access count of each web page, the occurrence of sub-sequences 
and the time spent between consecutive page accesses. 
Each of the above attributes represents a dimension in the 
feature space, and all the attributes together form a very high di-
mension space. Therefore, high-dimensional data analysis tools, 
such as the recently introduced diffusion wavelets, are used in 
our scheme. Diffusion wavelets can efficiently project the high-
dimensional data onto a low-dimensional space according to 
the correlations between various attributes, so that common 
anomaly detection algorithms can be applied. We demonstrate 
via simulation experiments that attackers and normal users can 
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As network attacks happen more and more frequently, concerns 
have been raised over network security. Recently, distributed 
denial of service (DDoS) attack becomes a popular method of 
attack, where the victim server receives millions of requests from 
numerous hosts distributed in the Internet. In that case, re-
sources of the server are all consumed and legitimate users can 
no longer be served normally. It is essential to differentiate 
between attackers and normal users, in order to filter out the 
attacking requests. Indeed, the access behavior of Web users 
is useful for this purpose, because this piece of information is 
only available at the server side and is difficult to be collected 
by attackers. Therefore, modeling access behavior has become 
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a common approach for anomaly-based detection in computer 
security. 
Anomaly-based detection is effective in detecting unseen at-
tacks which are much different from the normal behavior. In 
particular, work has been done to find out abnormal Web users 
by mining user behavior. Researchers in [20] project user history 
onto a vector space according to the page occurrences, and ap-
ply clustering algorithm directly on the high dimensional data. 
On the other hand, [4] uses Bayesian parameter estimation for 
finding the likelihood of each sub-traversal path independently, 
based on its previous probability distribution. However, the re-
lationships between sub-traversals are ignored and the scheme 
does not support real-time attack differentiation. 
Proposed Scheme 
In this thesis, we propose a real-time anomaly detection system. 
It is a host-based and anomaly-based detection system. When 
it receives an access request, the corresponding user history is 
processed and embedded in a lower dimensional space by diffu-
sion wavelets. The user is then evaluated and the corresponding 
outlier score is computed by comparing to the behavior of a 
predefined set of normal users. According to the server loading, 
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thresholds can be set on the outlier scores to eliminate the most 
suspicious accesses and ensure the normal users are served at 
higher priority. 
Contributions 
The contributions of this thesis are as follows: 
1. We design a real-time anomaly detection system for de-
fending HTTP flooding DDoS attacks. By comparing the 
browsing pattern of normal users, the system is able to 
detect abnormal sessions of various characteristics. We 
demonstrate that the detection rate for even short attack 
sessions is high, and most DDoS sessions are blocked after 
only a few requests. 
2. We apply sub-traversal analysis and the novel diffusion 
wavelets analysis to extract essential information from the 
access history of legitimate Web users. This efficiently re-
duces the dimensions of data, such that common techniques 
for anomaly detection become applicable. 
3. We perform simulation experiments using real-world Web 
access logs and demonstrate a significant reduction on the 
damage of HTTP flooding DDoS attacks. 
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1.2 Organization 
This thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we review 
several related works on anomaly detection for the Web, and 
some background information including overview on Web min-
ing, DDoS attack and defense, dimension reduction by graph 
analysis, and tools for anomaly detection. 
In Chapter 3, the idea and methodology of our system is first 
described. The system is divided into 2 parts, Reference Profile 
Construction (Part A) and Real-time Anomaly Detection and 
Response (Part B). The design and high level procedures of the 
2 parts are also described in this chapter. 
In Chapter 4，Reference Profile Construction (Part A) is dis-
cussed in detail. The reference data is cleaned in Data Prepara-
tion and user sessions are identified. Then, Reference Profile is 
constructed by converting the user sessions into feature vectors 
and projecting them onto a reduced space in Feature Extraction 
and Embedding Engine (FEE Engine). 
In Chapter 5, we describe the Real-time Anomaly Detection 
and Response (Part B) which governs the daily operation of the 
system. All new incoming requests are processed and projected 
onto the same reduced feature space by the same FEE Engine in 
Part A. Their outlier scores are then computed and acted upon 
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by the threshold-based anomaly detection modules. All found 
anomalies are reported to the front line filter in order to prevent 
further requests from the same users. 
In Chapter 6, we illustrate the procedure to select the optimal 
values of the system parameters and demonstrate their efficacy 
via simulation experiments. In addition, data sets of real-world 
access logs are used to simulate the performance of our system. 
The simulation results and computation requirement are also 
discussed and explained. 
• End of chapter. 
Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
2.1 Related Works 
On Web Log Mining, much research has been focused on the 
problem of finding frequent path traversal patterns of Web users 
3], classifying user navigation patterns [22] and optimizing the 
website organization [28]. 
For security purpose, work has also been done on analyzing 
web access logs to detect Web-based attacks. In [19], multiple 
measures, for example string length and character distribution 
of access requests, are extracted from web access logs to de-
tect anomalies, while [8] uses mainly signature-based detection. 
Some researchers have worked on analyzing user path history 
for anomaly detection, for example, Bayesian parameter esti-
mation is used in [4] for finding the likelihood of sub-traversal 
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 7 
paths based on their previous probability distributions, in order 
to determine whether a user session is abnormal. [20] projects 
user history onto a vector space according to page occurrences 
and detects abnormal Web users with clustering technique, but 
the sequential information and problems with high dimensional 
data are ignored. When user path history is treated as a string of 
symbols, the problem becomes similar to document classification 
problem. In particular, recently proposed diffusion wavelets, 
which is also used in our work, is applied in [30] for classifying 
document corpora in multiscale. 
Indeed, anomaly detection on Web access sequences is in na-
ture similar to other detection schemes for sequences. For exam-
ple, [12] uses Hidden Markov model (HMM) for learning system 
call sequences and predicting anomalies. 
2.2 Background Study 
2.2.1 World Wide Web 
World Wide Web is a large and publicly accessible document 
retrieval system operating on the Internet, where the documents 
are presented in form of Hypertext Markup Language (HTML) 
and interlinked by hyperlinks. 
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Figure 2.1: An example of Web site structure 
Web Structure 
The Web structure can be found by tracing the hyperlinks in 
each of the HTML documents, and the structure is typically 
presented by a directed graph. Each HTML document is rep-
resented by a node, while each hyperlink is represented by a 
directed edge. Figure 2.1 is an example drawn with Graphviz 
13], in which the numbered nodes represent the common entry 
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Properties of Web Access Logs 
Web Access Log is a kind of server log collected by Web servers, 
which records the interactions between clients and servers. In 
particular, Web Access Logs are the history of access sequences 
of the visitors, and each access log contains information about 
the access request and the corresponding results. A typical im-
plementation in Apache HTTP Server uses the Common Log 
Format [11], which includes the information listed in Table 2.1. 
Examples of Web access logs are shown in Table 2.2. 
Attribute Description 
IP Address Source IP address where the request comes from 
Date, Time and Time Zone Time when the server returns the result 
Request Target URL to the target resource on the server 
Status Code HTTP status code returned to the client 
Size Size of data returned to the client 
User Agent (optional) Software name and version of the client 
Referrer (optional) Location where the request is referred from 
Table 2.1: Attributes in Common Log Format 
In general, Web access logs are not limited to the page ac-
cess history, especially for dynamic Web sites, where the re-
turned pages are generated in real time. For the same URL re-
quest, the generated contents can be different for different users. 
Therefore, recording the URLs alone is not enough to show the 
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IP Date:Time URL Status Size 
192.168.1 .100 [01/Jan/2009:00:28:36 GET /index.html 200 9651 
192.168.] ..121 01/Jan/2009:00:34:50； GET /home.html 200 29106 
192.168.] ..121 01/Jan/2009:00:35:01； GET /net/ 200 2042 
192.168.] ..100 01/Jan/2009:00:50:23； GET /content.html 200 1561 
Table 2.2: Examples of Common Log Format 
user access history accurately. In this case, higher-level logs are 
needed, for example, the event logs generated by the applica-
tions implemented on Web servers. 
Web Mining 
As the Web becomes a large knowledge base, researchers are in-
terested in analyzing it in detail. The objectives of Web mining 
18] are: searching relevant information by query, extracting use-
ful knowledge, personalizing the information, and learning about 
individual users. In summary, there are mainly three working 
areas depending on the part of Web being analyzed: Web con-
tent mining, Web structure mining, and Web usage mining. 
In particular, Web usage mining focuses on information about 
how the users use the Web. This information is valuable to 
commercial business as well as for network security purposes, 
since the Web services are targeting at the human users after 
all. Information about the Web usage can be found in the access 
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history of the users, which is recorded in Web logs. The data 
mining techniques for mining Web logs are summarized in [7 
and [24 
2.2.2 Distributed Denial of Service Attack 
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack effectively prevents 
availability of the victim servers and stops legitimate users to be 
served. Typically, the attacker takes over the control of a large 
number of compromised hosts, called Bots, and manages them 
to flood requests to the victim at the same time. Consequently, 
the victim is overloaded by the large amount of access requests 
and cannot serve the normal users. 
With the aid of worms or malwares, an attacker is able to 
control thousands of hosts easily, and in fact, this kind of at-
tack is becoming popular recently due to the lack of effective 
defending schemes. 
Difficulties in Defending DDoS attacks 
DDoS attacks are difficult to be defended because the attack 
comes from different hosts in the Internet, and in many cases, 
content of the attack traffic looks much similar to the legitimate 
one. Therefore, it is hard to separate the attack out from the 
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traffic trunk. In particular, it is possible for a sophisticated 
HTTP flooding DDoS attack to generate HTTP requests to Web 
servers in a similar way as browsing by human. 
Current Approaches for Defending DDoS attacks 
Intrusion detection schemes for DDoS attacks are mainly classi-
fied by the detection location: network-based and host-based; or 
by the detection method: signature-based and anomaly-based. 
Network-based detection investigates the network conditions, 
for examples packet and routing statistics, in order to identify 
attacks before they reach to the servers. On the other hand, 
host-based detection is performed at the server side, and it in-
vestigates how the system responds to the traffic. 
As described in [9], signature-based detection identifies pre-
defined patterns of known attacks by investigating the packet 
features, conditions, arrangements and interrelationships among 
the resulting events in the system. It is in general more accurate, 
but the pitfall is its inability to detect unknown attack patterns. 
For that reason, anomaly-based detection is specially designed 
for detecting unknown attacks by comparing the behavior of 
current traffic to those of known normal traffic. It works even 
if the attack is never seen before. More details about anomaly 
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detection are included in Section 2.2.4. 
2.2.3 Tools for Dimension Reduction 
High dimensional data has to be simplified and reduced to lower 
dimensions before it can be analyzed efficiently. Most of time, 
we can collect uncountably many variables about a matter and 
describe it in a high dimensional space. However, it is inefficient 
to analyze all the variables, and sometimes we even cannot get 
any meaningful results in analysis because the collected data is 
too noisy and contains too many useless variables. 
As mentioned in [21]，the space grows exponentially with di-
mension, and the term "curse of dimensionality" usually refers 
to this explosion of space. In addition, the amount of data col-
lected is comparatively much fewer in general, as a result, most 
of the space is not filled with data and this behavior is called 
"empty space phenomenon". This prevents most of data mining 
tools from working efficiently. Unfortunately, it is difficult to re-
duce the dimensions manually, because the dimensions are too 
many for people to process and the underlying transformation 
is usually not known [16 . 
The goal of dimension reduction is to find out how variables 
interact with each other and extract information that hides in 
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lower dimensions. Below, we introduce some tools used for di-
mension reduction in this thesis. 
Diffusion wavelets [6] provides a framework for multiscale 
analysis on high dimensional data, for example large graphs. As 
described in [23], diffusion wavelets extends the Fourier analysis 
on graphs, and provides a wavelet approach to analyze graphs. 
The multiscale property of diffusion wavelets allows it to analyze 
data all the way from detailed to coarse levels, as other wavelet 
analysis do. According to what level of detail one is looking 
at, this tool helps to compress information embedded in large 
graphs and considerably reduces its dimension. 
Fourier analysis on Graphs 
Before looking at the details of diffusion wavelets, below is a brief 
review of Fourier analysis on graphs, where diffusion wavelets 
extends from. Fourier analysis on graphs is based on the Spec-
tral Graph Theory [5], in which the graph Laplacian matrix L 
is being analyzed. 
Let G = (V"，£^ , VK) be an undirected graph, where V^  二 
is the set of vertices, E = {(t^i,巧•)} is the set 
of edges for any 1 < < n, and W is the weight matrix in 
which Wij is the weight of edge between Vi and vj. The ver-
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tices can be projected onto the Euclidean space IR" according to 
W, where each row represents the vector of a vertex and each 
column represents the value in a particular dimension. In that 
case, the graph G is said to be embedded in W^. 
The Laplacian matrix L is an n by n matrix defined by 
L = D-W (2.1) 
where D is a diagonal matrix and Da = Wij- In Fourier 
analysis, L is decomposed into the eigenvectors Ci, 1 < i < n, 
with the corresponding eigenvalues where 
Lii = Hi (2.2) 
Without loss of generality, we assume Ai < A2 S … g An. In-
deed, the eigenvectors are functions on the vertices which trans-
forms the graph into the eigenspace spanned by a set of eigen-
vectors, 
= (2.3) 
where \k < e. Depending on the value of precision e, the graph 
can be approximated in a /c-dimensional Euclidean space IR左.If 
the precision e increases, more eigenvectors are included in the 
set Ee for re-constructing the graph more accurately. 
As stated in [29]; Fourier analysis works well in detecting 
global smoothness but poor in local changes. This is why dif-
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fusion wavelets is introduced for providing multiscale analysis 
on graphs, in order to investigate both local (small scale) and 
global (large scale) features. 
Diffusion Wavelets 
In [23], the overall idea of diffusion wavelets is presented. Ba-
sically, diffusion wavelets extends the Fourier analysis of graphs 
by supplementing some wavelet-like multiscale properties. It 
performs wavelet dilation by multiple-step random walks on the 
graph, called diffusion. At each step of random walks, or degree 
of diffusion, eigen-decomposition is done for analyzing the graph 
in the way similar to Fourier analysis. The one-step random 
walk is specified by the transition probability P of the graph, 
P = D-^W (2.4) 
while the diffusion action is specified by the diffusion operator 
T which is equivalent to the normalized P, 
T = D'^PD-'^ 
= D - ' ^ W D - i (2.5) 
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T is closely related to the normalized Laplacian matrix C = 
D-�LD-i, by substituting W = D - L in Equation 2.5, 
T = D"{D-L)D" 
= I - C (2.6) 
Below is the brief description of the diffusion wavelets process 
following the development in [30], while more details can be 
found in the original work [6]. The notations used in describing 
diffusion wavelets are shown in Table 2.3. 
Notation Description 
T Diffusion operator 
(f>i Orthonormal bases of scaling functions 
Vi The space spanned by 
A Orthonormal bases of wavelet functions 
Wi The space spanned by ipi 
[J \4>a Representation of T with respect to 
(j)a in the domain and 0b in the range 
Representation of (pb with respect to 0a 
e Positive threshold for selecting eigenfunctions 
QR Function to compute QR eigen-decomposition 
Table 2.3: Notations in diffusion wavelets 
Algorithm 1 is the standard routine for computing diffusion 
wavelets, which iterates from level 1 to the specified terminating 
level J. The symbol Tj is defined as the j-th dyadic power of 
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T represented in the basis 杯 At level I {j = I — 1), Tj is 
decomposed into a new set of orthonormal bases according 
to the threshold e on line 4. Diffusion is then performed on the 
current diffusion operator T^ ^ on line 5 by self multiplication 
with respect to After that, Tj+i is ready for the next 
level. In summary, the useful outputs from each iteration are 
Algorithm 1 Diffusion wavelets process 
/ / Define T ,全 [T^t； 
Function Wj.}/:(}) — DWT(To, J, QR, e； 
for j = 0 to J - 1 do 
([0州 k.，[了 2tr”—QR(了 j，^ 
{[ipjU^, dummy) — Q R ( / ⑷ ） - e ) ； 
end for 
Outputs of the routine are orthonormal bases and 
{ipjYj二. The spaces and {WjYj-^ spanned by these 
orthonormal bases come from a series of decomposition of the 
original space Vo spanned by where = / in general, as 
shown in Figure 2.2. In particular, the spaces have 
monotonically decreasing dimensions, i.e. Vj+i C Vj, while Vj = 
Vj+i e Wj and V}+i 丄 W j . 
This algorithm works for dimension reduction because the 
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Vq Vi ^ V2 ^ ... —> Vj-i —>• Vj 
i i i i 
Wo V^ I VK/-1 
Figure 2.2: A series of decomposition of Vq 
number of eigenvalues larger than e decreases when the power 
of T increases, as shown in [6 . 
T^i = Xi^i 
T% = XiT^-'^i 
= m (2.7) 
Since T is normalized, its eigenvalues are in the range Ai G 
0，1]. When the power of T increases, the power of Xi increases 
correspondingly. As a result, the eigenvalues Af decreases. This 
means the rank of e-approximated T^ ^ decreases as it diffuses. 
Therefore, the dimension can be reduced more and more when 
the graph diffuses to higher levels. 
From the application point of view, diffusion wavelets helps 
to reduce the dimensions of data by projecting them onto spaces 
{巧}/=1，which are reduced from the original space VQ. Depend-
ing on the desired number of dimensions to investigate, the level 
j can be chosen. Let [data](j). be a data vector on Vj. The 
high-dimensional raw data [cbtaj^ can be reduced to a lower 
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dimension on space Vj by 
data](p. = [data](f)Q (2.8) 
where the extended basis functions [0 <h 
(t^jUo = 1 [如-山 j—2...[01]0�[0O]0o (2.9) 
can be computed from the algorithm outputs 
2.2.4 Tools for Anomaly Detection 
As defined in [2], anomalies are patterns in data that do not 
conform to a well defined notion of normal behavior. It is a 
supervised detection that a set of purely normal data has to 
be obtained before any detection is performed. The techniques 
used for anomaly detection can be classified into: Classifica-
tion based, Nearest Neighbor based, Clustering based, Statis-
tical based, Information Theoretic based, and Spectral based. 
The details of these techniques can be found in [2 . 
In particular, spectral based technique is used in our work 
to reduce the dimension of data，as described in 2.2.3. Also, 
Nearest Neighbor based technique is used to evaluate the degree 
of abnormality of a data point with respect to the given normal 
points. Below is an introduction of the Nearest Neighbor based 
technique. 
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Nearest Neighbor based Anomaly Detection 
In the nearest neighbor approach, a data point is compared 
with its kjvN nearest neighbors in terms of distance, and so the 
anomaly is also called distance-based outlier. The advantage [1 
of nearest neighbor is that no prior knowledge about abnormal 
distribution is needed, and as long as a distance,measure is de-
fined, an outlier score can be assigned to every data point, where 
the higher the outlier score, the more abnormal the point is. 
A common practice is to calculate the Euclidean distance of 
kjsfN nearest neighbors, and then the outlier score is the aver-
age of the /catAT distances. The nested loops method for com-
puting the nearest neighbors takes 0{d • n) length of time to 
compute the distances from a given point to all n data points in 
(i-dimensional space. This brute force searching has the worst 
time complexity. In [17], approximation is introduced to search 
for nearest neighbors and the time complexity is improved to 
0{{d\og'^ d){d + logn)). More sophisticated nearest neighbor 
algorithms are summarized in [2 
0 . 1 . 丨 , 
I — ROC (AUC=0.8772^ 
0.4 0.6 0.8 
False Positive 
Figure 2.3: An example of ROC graph 
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2.2.5 Receiver operating characteristics (ROC) 
Analysis 
Receiver operating characteristics (ROC) graphs are commonly 
used in data mining to visualize the performance of classifiers. 
Following the development in [10], the true positive rates (TP) 
are plotted on the x-axis of ROC graphs while the correspond-
ing false positive rates (FP) are plotted on y-axis, as shown 
in Figure 2.3. The curve on ROC graphs indicates the TP-
FP relationship, and equivalently the tradeoffs between benefits 
(true positive) and costs (false positive). Therefore, a better-
performed system should have a lower FP and a higher TP. 
Under the context of our anomaly detection system, the posi-
tive case is an abnormal user session. 
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For a random classifier, whether a sample is a positive or 
negative, it has a probability Prandom to be classified into the 
positive class. Therefore, the false positive rate is 
number of negative samples classified as positive 
^ ^random ~ 7 r i ~ ^random 
number or negative samples 
and the true positive rate is 
number of positive samples classified as positive 
隱= number of positive samples = 尸 _ 
therefore, 
FPrandom = TPrandom 二 Prandom 
By setting different values of Prandom, the diagonal in a ROC 
graph is drawn for all random classifiers. If a classifier is plotted 
above the diagonal, i.e. with FP < TP, it performs better than 
random guessing. 
Area under the ROC curve (AUG) 
In order to compare two different types of classifiers, i.e. two 
ROC curves, each ROC graph can be summarized to a scalar 
value, called the Area Under the ROC Curve (AUG), which 
ranges from 0 to 1. Indeed, the statistical meaning of AUG 
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is the probability that the classifier will rank a randomly cho-
sen positive instance higher than a randomly chosen negative 
instance [10]. In our system, AUG means the probability that a 
randomly chosen known abnormal user session will have higher 
outlier score (more abnormal) than a randomly chosen known 
normal user session. In particular, the AUG for random guess-
ing is 0.5, and thus useful classifiers typically have AUG values 
larger than that. In short, a larger AUG means a better per-
formed classifier in general. 
• End of chapter, 
Chapter 3 
System Design 
Our proposed system is a host-based and anomaly-based detec-
tion system. When an access request arrives, it is evaluated by 
the system and an outlier score is assigned by comparing it to 
a predefined set of normal access logs. According to the server 
loading, thresholds can be set on the outlier scores to eliminate 
the most suspicious accesses and ensure the normal users are 
served at higher priority. 
3.1 Methodology 
For our system to work, it is assumed that it is very difficult 
for anyone to know about the general user behavior on a web 
server, except for the server administrator, who is privileged to 
analyze the access logs. This is realistic because the users are 
25 
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distributed all around in the Internet, the user access data can 
only be collected from a large number of hosts and/or interme-
diate network nodes. 
A sophisticated HTTP flooding DDoS attack tries to gener-
ate traffic very similar to the normal ones, such that it is hard 
for the servers to differentiate between the attack and normal 
traffic. Our system is designed to use knowledge about the user 
behavior, which is only known at the server side； to identify the 
attack traffic. In that case, even if the attackers know how a 
server defends, they are not able to by-pass the anomaly detec-
tion system. In addition, when an abnormal session is found, all 
its further requests will be dropped. This makes attacks based 
on feedback with respect to request drops more difficult, because 
a large amount of compromised hosts are blocked when the at-
tacker searches for a normal traversal sequence. Also, thresholds 
for detecting anomalies are adjusted dynamically according to 
the loading of Web server, therefore the normal traversal se-
quence obtained by the attacker may become abnormal later 
when the server is more overloaded, and the attacker has to 
search for another normal traversal sequence again. 
In practice, attackers may be able to guess the common en-
try points of web sites, but the way users traverse after the 
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entry points is still difficult to be found.For newly arrived users, 
whether they are normal users or attackers, they all tend to ac-
cess the common entry pages of the Web site, and this results 
in a weak differentiation power to them. However, as the access 
history of each particular user builds up, the normal users and 
attackers become more different in behavior, thus our system 
can separate them out more effectively. One limitation is that 
it takes time to build up the access history, while the server has 
to process several initial requests from the attackers, and there-
fore, it can still be overloaded. However, in the case where the 
attackers are sophisticated enough that they are not detected 
by any other traditional measures, our system still presents a 
powerful alternative solution. 
3.2 System Overview 
Our anomaly detection system consists of two parts, namely 
Part A: Reference Profile Construction, and 
Part B: Real-time Anomaly Detection and Response. 
The relationship between the 2 major parts is shown in Fig-
ure 3.1. Reference Profile Construction (Part A) is responsible 
for analyzing and processing the given reference data extracted 
from legitimate user behavior. It converts user access data to 
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feature vectors in Feature Extraction and Embedding Engine 
(FEE Engine) and outputs Reference Profile, which defines the 
normal user behavior for the supervised anomaly detection in 
Part B. On the other hand, Real-time Anomaly Detection and 
Response (Part B) is responsible for investigating all incoming 
requests. It processes the corresponding user sessions by the 
same FEE Engine in Part A，and then determines their degrees 
of abnormality by comparing them to those in Reference Pro-
file. Different actions are taken to the requests according to 
their degrees of anomaly. 
Part B governs the daily operation of our system, and it is 
kept running all the time for providing real-time protection to 
the Web server. However, Part A is only run periodically, for 
example once a week, when the user behavior changes and so 
the set of reference data has to be updated. In practice, Part A 
has to be run at least once before Part B is started. 
The overviews of Part A and B are discussed in the following 
sections, while their details are presented in Chapter 4 and 5 
respectively. 
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Incoming Request 
Outgoing Response 




(Periodical ly R u n ) 




(Real - t ime Running ) 
Figure 3.1: System Overview: Relationship between Part A and Part B 
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Reference Profile 
Figure 3.2: Procedures for Reference Profile Construction (Part A) 
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3.3 Reference Profile Construction 
The procedures for Reference Profile Construction are summa-
rized in Figure 3.2. In particular, the 2 procedures are Data 
Preparation and Feature Extraction and Embedding Engine (FEE 
Engine). 
In Data Preparation, irrelevant information is removed and 
access targets are unified by "Data Cleaning". After that, the 
whole reference data is divided into user sessions by "Session 
Recognition", while "Path Completion" adds lost requests back 
to the sessions with the aid of the Web site structure. 
In Feature Extraction and Embedding Engine, each user ses-
sion is broken into a series of sub-sequences by "Sub-Sequence 
Extraction", where rare sub-sequences are filtered out. Option-
ally, the sub-sequences are hashed in "Hashing", in order to 
limit the number of different sub-sequences. In "Feature Vector 
Construction", the session is then converted to a feature vector 
by the occurrence frequency of the (hashed) sub-sequences. The 
session is finally embedded in a feature space of much reduced 
dimension using diffusion wavelets. All the embedded feature 
vectors of user sessions in the reference data are then included 
in Reference Profile. 
Reference Profile is constructed and provided to Part B as 
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a reference of normal user behavior for the supervised anomaly 
detection. In addition, after processing the reference data, FEE 
Engine is ready for Part B to convert newly arrived user sessions 
to embedded feature vectors. 
More details of this part are presented in Chapter 4. 
3.4 Real-time Anomaly Detection and Response 
Real-time Anomaly Detection and Response governs the daily 
operation of the system, where incoming access requests are in-
vestigated by the procedures summarized in Figure 3.3. 
When a request arrives, its corresponding session is identified 
by "Session Identifier" and then checked by "Session Filter". If 
it is previously marked as an abnormal session, it will be dropped 
immediately. After that, it is combined with the previous access 
history of that user session to form an extended user sequence, 
and "Data Preparation" is performed as described in Part A. 
The user session is then ready to be analyzed. 
"FEE Engine" is exactly the same engine used in Part A, it 
converts the user sequence to a data point in the reduced feature 
space. By comparing to Reference Profile provided by Part A, 
whether the user session is abnormal is determined by "Anomaly 
Detection". If an abnormal session is found, it will be reported 
CHAPTER 3. SYSTEM DESIGN 33 
Incoming Request 
Outgoing Response 
Figure 3.3: Procedures for Real-time Anomaly Detection and Response (Part 
B) 
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to Session Filter for preventing further requests of the session. 
More details of this part are presented in Chapter 5. 
3.5 Chapter Summary 
In summary, overview of the whole system is described, includ-
ing the methodology for tackling the DDoS attacks. The system 
is divided into 2 parts: Reference Profile Construction (Part A) 
and Real-time Anomaly Detection and Response (Part B). Part 
A is responsible for analyzing and processing the given reference 
data and providing Reference Profile to Part B. Besides, Part 
B governs the daily operation of the system for investigating all 
incoming access requests with reference to the obtained Refer-
ence Profile. The two parts are discussed in detail in Chapter 4 
and 5 respectively. 
• End of chapter. 
Chapter 4 
Reference Profile Construction 
Our system is a supervised based detection system where a set of 
purely normal reference data, presented in Reference Profile, is 
used to compare with new data. The reference data is cleaned 
in Data Preparation, and then converted into feature vectors 
and projected onto a reduced space in Feature Extraction and 
Embedding Engine (FEE Engine). In this chapter, the steps, as 
summarized in Figure 3.2, for constructing the Reference Profile 
are described in detail. 
4.1 Web Access Logs Collection 
Web Access Logs record the interactions between the server and 
Web clients. It is the sequences of actions performed by visitors 
on the Web server, and the properties of the access logs are 
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described in Section 2.2.1. 
Static verse Dynamic Web Site 
In a static Web site, the Web pages remain unchanged most of 
the time. The targeted URL in the HTTP requests accurately 
reflect the user actions and contents returned. Therefore, simply 
recording the URLs is enough to know the user actions. 
However, as discussed in Section 2.2.1，dynamic Web sites 
generate the returned pages in real time. For the same URL 
request, the generated contents can be different for different 
users. Therefore, the targeted page in HTTP request is not 
enough to show the user access history accurately. Higher-level 
logs are needed, for example, the event logs generated by the 
applications implemented on Web servers. The events have ab-
stract meanings, like "Login", "Search" and etc., that identify 
the user actions. In that case, even when the Web contents 
change frequently, the high-level browsing behavior, in terms of 
the categories of Web pages, of users seldom changes. For exam-
ple, many users access to the "Weather" section after the "News 
Headline" section, no matter how their contents or URLs change 
every day, the browsing pattern "News Headline then Weather" 
changes infrequently. 
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Indeed, the way to analyze the user behavior is similar and 
our system is workable for both types of web sites. In this thesis, 
only static web site is discussed as an example. 
Collecting Normal Access Logs 
The access logs collected in this chapter is used as reference 
profile in the later anomaly detection. It represents the normal 
user behavior in the system. By definition, the access logs are 
normal if some given types of attack are not found in the logs. 
It is possible for the normal behavior to vary at different 
time. The time to collect the logs should be a period when 
normal users usually access. The amount of normal data have to 
be large enough to cover all the normal behavior. Log data of a 
period of about 1 to 2 days is large enough to have good anomaly 
detection results, as shown in our experiments in Chapter 6. 
4.2 Data Preparation 
Typically, Web access logs are collected to a single document, 
and the logs from all the users are mixed up. Before analyzing 
the logs, it is essential to separate the logs for different users. 
A number of works have been done on breaking down a large 
piece of log data and converting it to formatted data for further 
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analysis. Based on [7], Robert Cooley et al proposed a complete 
process of preparing Web access logs for mining browsing pat-
terns. In this section, the 3 main steps for preparing Web access 
logs are discussed: Data Cleaning, User Session Recognition, 
and Path Completion. 
Data Cleaning 
Data cleaning process removes the useless information from the 
raw log data, and makes the logs less noisy. Web access logs 
include all the access history of the users, and some of them are 
not useful in the analysis in the later processes. In our system, 
we are only interested in the accesses to HTML documents, and 
therefore, all other accesses history, for example accesses to im-
age files, are ignored and removed. Error logs, like those with 
HTTP status code 404 (File not Found), are also removed. 
In addition, the URL of the request targets are unified in 
this process. Some of the documents can be reached by multiple 
URLs, for example, URL “/，，points to /index.html by default 
which is the same as URL "/index.html". In this case, the same 
document is treated as multiple different documents in URL 
and this leads to confusion in later analysis. Therefore, all these 
targets are re-mapped to corresponding unified URLs. 
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User Session Recognition 
A user session is a set of continuously collected access logs for 
a particular visitor. In this process, the clean log data is sepa-
rated into user sessions. In the Internet, clients often access to 
Web servers through proxies and Network Address Translation 
(NAT) gateways, such that it is possible for different clients to 
have the same IP address recorded on the servers. In our system, 
we identify a unique user by both IP address and User Agent. 
However, IP address and User Agent alone are sometimes not 
enough to differentiate users on a busy server due to a higher 
collision probability. An advanced method is proposed in [7] to 
further differentiate users by the browsing history together with 
the Web site structure. 
In order to differentiate between repeated visits from the 
same user, all the accesses in a user session have to be con-
tinuous. According to the Web statistics summarized in [26], 
the empirical session timeout for Web is 25 minutes. In our 
implementation, the session timeout is set to be 30 minutes, as 
most of the commercial products do [7 
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Path Completion 
Web traffic is sometimes cached in proxies, and also Web users 
often click the "back" button when browsing. Therefore, the 
Web access logs alone do not record the complete browsing se-
quence of the users. As a result, if the logs show an access 
sequence Pi —尸2, in some cases, the hyperlink to P2 does not 
exist in F\. In fact, the complete access sequence can be guessed 
by examining the user's access history, the site structure and the 
referrer log entries. The basic idea is to trace back in the site 
structure and find a feasible path linking Pi and P2 to replace 
the incomplete path in the original logs. 
4.3 Feature Extraction and Embedding En-
gine (FEE Engine) 
Feature Extraction and Embedding Engine (FEE Engine) con-
verts user access sequences into feature vectors, and then projects 
them onto a reduced space by diffusion wavelets. 
After Data Preparation, we denote the data set with all k 
user access sequences by 
.1[； = 0/《，《=1，2,丨，/0} (4.1) 
and the user access sequence of user session i with ni accesses 
Uo 
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by 
Ui = (Pl’P2’...，Pni) (4.2) 
where pj G P, Vj and D is the set of d unique pages existing in the 
Web site. Moreover, the notations for the user access sequence 
of user session i in the engine are summarized in Figure 4.1. 
m 一 ur^b 一 Jilter 
Entry Marker Sub-sequence Rare Sub-sequence 
Insertion Windowing Filtering 
Hashing 
Ui 一 Ui 一 v/rh 
Diffusion Wavelets Feature Vector 
Embedding Conversion 
Figure 4.1: Summary of Reference Profile Construction and notations for a 
user session at different stages 
In order to analyze the access logs, the user access sequences 
have to be represented in a consistent form. Therefore, a feature 
space V is constructed with m attributes in a m-dimensional 
space, i.e. V C R爪.The user access sequence ui is represented 
by a feature vector 
Hi = (ai,a2,...,am) (4.3) 
where Ui G V c r , V i 
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In the following, we describe the process of mapping user 
sessions to the feature space, U —> V, and then embedding them 
in a lower dimensional space. 
4.3.1 Sub-Sequence Extraction 
In our system, the attributes used for analyzing user sessions 
are built from the occurrence frequencies of sub-sequences. The 
reason for using sub-sequences is that they describe the common 
features of user sessions, and at the same time, preserve some 
sequential information between page accesses. By increasing the 
window size W, more sequential information is preserved while 
the relevance between user sessions is reduced, vice versa. The 
following is the process of converting a user session into a vector 
of occurrence frequencies of sub-sequences. 
Marking Entry Pages 
Firstly, a special entry page, ENT, is added to the beginning 
of the sequence. It is because there are only a few popular 
entry pages in the normal access data, as shown in Figure 2.1, 
but it may not be the case for attack data. It is meaningful to 
distinguish the starting sub-sequences from the others by adding 
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the special marker. After that, the user access sequence becomes 
Ui =�ENT,PhP2,…,Prii) (4.4) 
with length ni + 1. The document set expands to a size of d + 1 
and becomes 
D = D U {ENT} (4.5) 
Sub-sequence Windowing 
A sliding window of size W is then applied on the user access 
sequence to divide it into a series of sub-sequence. Let the set 
of all sub-sequences with length W be Sw, where 
Sw = (4.6) 
The user access sequence Ui is broken into nf^ ^ = ni + l + (VK — 1) 
sub-sequences by sliding the window, and becomes 
u f " = (si，S2，...,、『uO，Sj E Sw,Vj (4.7) 
If W = 2，the sub-sequences are si = (ENT.pi) , s<i = (Pi，P2) 
and etc.. The number of different sub-sequences in Sw is {d + 
1严，which increases exponentially with W. In practice, many 
sub-sequences do not show up in the reference data, and as a 
result, the number of ever-appeared sub-sequences actually in-
creases linearly with W^ as shown in Section 6.3. In Figure 6.6, 
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the number of ever-appeared sub-sequences is even decreasing 
when W is too large. 
Rare Sub-sequence Filtering 
It is a common practice in data mining [30] [31] to filter out 
the rare attributes before further analysis. In general, those 
rare attributes are less informative, and their removal makes 
the data set less noisy. •• 
Sub-sequences with occurrence less than a chosen threshold 
tliF are filtered. We show that the optimal threshold can be 
found by considering the occurrence distribution of the sub-
sequences as discussed in Section 6.3, which all the filtered infre-
quent sub-sequences are combined and mapped to a new symbol 
^^ R^ARE • The filtering process can be described by 
FRth, ： {Sw U {sub^^^,}} (4.8) 
s油RARE if o c c u r r e n c e < thp 
sub otherwise 
(4.9) 
where occurrence(sit6) is the occurrence of sub in the reference 
data. Sw only contains 各从乜尺細 and frequent sub-sequences 
in the reference user sessions, while Sw contains all the sub-
/S 
sequences with length W constructed from D and some of them 
FRthp : sub e Sw 
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are never appeared in any user session. After filtering, the user 
access sequence becomes 
lifter = ( 石 ， 石 ， e S w ^ j (4.10) 
where si = FRthpisi). 
4.3.2 Hash Function on Sub-sequences (optional) 
Even after filtering out the rare sub-sequences, sometimes, there 
are still too many attributes for analysis. In [27], it is sug-
gested to apply a hash function on the attribute set in order to 
reduce the number of attributes. Hashing the attributes lim-
its the number of attributes by randomly combining attributes. 
In that case, any attribute has a chance to be combined with 
other attributes, instead of only those rare attributes when fil-
tering by threshold in Section 4.3.1. This lossy process damages 
the performance of anomaly detection, as shown in Section 6.3. 
Therefore, hashing should be applied optionally when there are 
too many attributes to compute diffusion wavelets in term of 
memory as described in 6.5. 
A hash function if爪，with a set of m distinct outputs, denoted 
by H t^i, is used to hash each sub-sequence, and then the user 
access sequence becomes 
U严={Hmih), ...，HmM) (4.11) 
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where 
HmlSw ^ Mm = {hi, /l2,…，hm-U K ^ } (4.12) 
Hm :seSw 
KARE if s = subRARE 
(4.13) 
{"1，"2，…’ " m - i } otherwise 
The attribute h膽 e is specifically for the filtered sub-sequences 
in Section 4.3.1，while the remaining m— 1 hash outputs are for 
the rest of sub-sequences. • 
4.3.3 Feature Vector Construction 
As mentioned before, the user sessions have to be represented 
in a consistent form by feature vectors 
Ui = ( 1 ^ 1 ， 仍 ， … ( 4 . 1 4 ) 
where Ui 6 V C In the feature space V, each of the 
dimension vj is defined as the occurrence frequency of hj in the 
user access sequence 
With the consistent representation of each user session, all 
the user sessions can be put into a single mxk matrix A, where 
each row presents a feature and each column represents a user 
session. 
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4.3.4 Diffusion Wavelets Embedding 
The principles of diffusion wavelets is introduced in Section 
2.2.3. In our application, every feature is considered as a node 
on a graph, and the weights between the nodes are the corre-
lation between the features. By diffusion wavelets, a series of 
basis, with decreasing number of dimensions, is computed. This 
helps to reduce dimensions of the feature space and increase the 
efficiency of anomaly detection. The embedding operation can 
be represented by 
DWj : Ui — [ui]^. (4.15) 
where [ui](j)j refers to embedding Ui in diffusion wavelets basis 
at level j. 
Computing Extended Basis 
The m X m weight matrix of the graph can be constructed by 
W = AA^ (4.16) 
where the entry Wi j represents the correlation between feature i 
and j. The weight matrix is normalized to the transition matrix, 
P = D-^W (4.17) 
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Since the graph in this application is undirected, the diffusion 
operator is identical to the transition matrix, 
T = P (4.18) 
Referring to Algorithm 1 in Section 2.2.3，with the inputs 
{To = T, (^>0 = / } and tunable parameters {J, e}, a series of 
extended basis {[0j]0o}/=i can be obtained, while j is the level 
of diffusion wavelets. 
The weight matrix W summarizes the correlation between 
features in the data set A. On the other hand, the extended 
basis {[</>• }/=i are the compressed versions of W, providing 
both detailed and coarse views for user sessions embedded in 
the space Vj. 
Dimension Reduction in Feature Space 
At a given level j, the user sessions can be embedded in the 
reduced space by the extended basis 
[^ih = DWj{ui) = (4.19) 
or all user sessions together 
l^k = (4.20) 
where [A](f,. is a mfx k matrix, and ruj is the number of dimen-
sions at level j. The dimensions of feature space is reduced from 
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m to rrij. 
4.3.5 Numerical Example of Feature Set Reduction 
At different stages of FEE Engine, the feature set is reduced 
by various methods. In Table 4.1，the sizes of feature set for 
data set UofS obtained in our experiments, with the parameters 
described in Section 6.3, are shown. Sub-sequence hashing is 
skipped because the size of feature set after Rare Sub-sequence 
Filtering is small enough for diffusion wavelets basis computa-
tion on our workstation. 
The size of feature set is reduced significantly by FEE Engine, 
especially in Diffusion Wavelets Embedding, and this enables 
our system to handle high-dimensional data. 
Stage in FEE Engine Symbol of User Session Size of Feature Set 
Sub-sequence Windowing 3275 
Rare Sub-sequence Filtering 1489 
Sub-sequence Hashing (optional) (skipped) 
Diffusion Wavelets Embedding 61 
Table 4.1: Sizes of the feature set at different stages in FEE Engine (Statistics 
for data set UofS in the experiments in Chapter 6) 
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4.3.6 Reference Profile and Further Use of FEE Engine 
As the output of Part A, Reference Profile is provided to Part 
B for anomaly detection. It contains all the user sessions in the 
reference data embedded in the reduced feature space, i.e. 
Reference Profile = [A](i,. (4.21) 
On the other hand, in order to compare new incoming user 
sessions to the reference ones, both of them have to be projected 
onto the same feature space. Therefore, exactly the same FEE 
Engine is used for processing new incoming user access sessions 
in Part B. 
4.4 Chapter Summary 
In summary, this chapter describes in detail the way to process 
normal reference data, as summarized in Figure 4.1. The ref-
erence data collected is first cleaned and then user sessions are 
recognized. In FEE Engine, user access sequences in the data 
are broken into sub-sequences and then converted into feature 
vectors. Finally, the vectors are embedded in lower dimensional 
spaces by diffusion wavelets, and they are included in the Ref-
erence Profile for anomaly detection in Part B. 
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• End of chapter. 
Chapter 5 
Real-time Anomaly Detection 
and Response 
Real-time Anomaly Detection and Response (Part B) governs 
the daily operation of our system and investigates all incoming 
requests, as shown in Figure 5.1. In particular, newly arrived 
user sessions are processed and embedded in the feature space 
by Feature Extraction and Embedding Engine (FEE Engine). 
Distance-based outlier scores are then assigned to the user ses-
sions by comparing them to the Reference Profile. After that, 
the sessions are examined by a threshold-based anomaly detec-
tion, while abnormal ones are blocked. In the following, the 
whole detection process is described in detail. 
52 
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Incoming Request 
^S^sion Histo^) 
(Length < ly - 1) or (Length > E) 
Outlier Collector 
FEE Engine (in Part A) 
Reference Profile 










Figure 5.1: Architecture of Real-time Anomaly Detection and Response (Part 
B) 
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5.1 Session Filtering and Data Preparation 
The user session i of the incoming request is first identified. 
Afterwards, Session Filter matches the session i to a set of pre-
viously detected abnormal sessions, and drops it if it is found 
abnormal. The passed request is then combined with the access 
history of the same session, and goes through .the Data Prepa-
ration procedures as same as those in Part A. Let Pnew be the 
new access request. After the combination, the length of the 
user access sequence is increased by one and becomes 
= {UuPnew} (5.1) 
5.2 Feature Extraction and Embedding 
After constructing the Reference Profile in Part A, all the set-
tings in Feature Extraction and Embedding Engine (FEE En-
gine) are kept unchanged. It is because the engine has to be 
used for processing the user access sequences in Part B. When 
the user access sequence u* passes through the engine, it is first 
broken into sub-sequences by sliding window W to form (uj 产, 
and then mapped to hash outputs (u*)^ ^^^ by the summarized 
mapping M, . 
= (5.2) 
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The feature vector u* is computed by the occurrence frequency 
of each hash output in u^  is then projected onto the 
reduced space Vj at the selected diffusion wavelets level j, 
i ^ h = D 顺 ） (5.3) 
Finally, the vector is used to compute the outlier score in 
the following section. 
5.3 Distance-based Outlier Scores Calculation 
For determining a data point to be an outlier, the density of 
reference data points around it is a key evidence. A common 
practice is to investigate the distances to the kNN nearest neigh-
bors by k-NN algorithms. More details about k-NN can be found 
in Section 2.2.4. 
In our system, the outlier score of each user session is com-
puted by the sum of its Euclidean distances to the kNN nearest 
reference data points in Reference Profile ([^ l]^ .^). It should be 
noted that when the distance is zero, the two user sessions are 
identical at that level of view, however this does not imply the 
two user sequences are identical because of the lossy process in 
data preparation and multiscale embedding. 
The score implies how far its reference neighbors are, and 
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thus indicates how likely the point of [tt^ ]^ . falls into an empty 
area. The higher the score, the more abnormal the user session 
is. 
5.4 Anomaly Detection and Response 
The anomaly detection in our system is dynamic threshold-
based detection, while the response to anomalies is feedback-
based. In each anomaly detection module MOD/, there is a 
specific threshold thi assigned. All user sessions with outlier 
scores greater than thi are defined to be abnormal, and normal 
otherwise. All abnormal user sessions are collected by Outlier 
Collector, and then reported to Session Filter. In that case, in-
formation about the anomalies is fed back to the front line filter 
of the system, and then all further requests of those user ses-
sions will be dropped. By dynamically adjusting the thresholds, 
the Web server loading can be controlled and the influence to 
normal users can be minimized at the same time. 
5.4.1 Length-Based Anomaly Detection Modules 
The system is designed to process user sessions in different anomaly 
detection modules MOD/, as shown in Figure 5.1，according to 
the length of their access sequences, or equivalently, number of 
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page accesses in their traversal paths. The modules are identical 
but each has an independent threshold. At the Length Splitter 
shown in the figure, if the user session is shorter than W — 1 
requests, anomaly detection will be skipped and the newly ar-
rived request will be directly passed to the Web server, because 
the length of user sequence is not even long enough to have a 
sub-sequence. If the sequence is long enough, it will be assigned 
to an anomaly detection module MOD/ according to its length I. 
However, if it is longer than E, the request will also be passed 
to the web server directly, because this session has passed the 
anomaly detection for multiple times (from — 1 to 五)’ it is 
believed not to be an anomaly, and all its upcoming requests 
are treated as normal. 
The purpose of this design is to allow different thresholds to 
be set for filtering user sessions with different lengths. For a 
newly arrived request, if it is able to pass the Session Filter, it 
implies that its corresponding access history was found normal. 
Indeed, longer user sessions should have passed the anomaly 
detection for more times, and thus they are less abnormal com-
pared to the shorter ones. It is verified from our experiment 
that the outlier scores for users with longer history tend to be 
lower, as shown in Figure 5.2. 
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Figure 5.2: Outlier score distribution of 10000 sample user sessions in differ-
ent Anomaly Detection Modules (Different lengths of user sessions) 
If all the user sessions are mixed together and a single thresh-
old is used for anomaly detection, most of the anomaly found 
will be short user sessions. This makes the detection bias to-
wards short user sessions, and less likely to detect the abnormal 
ones in returning users. 
In addition, the session lengths generally fit some log-normal 
distributions [26]. A sample traversal-length distribution ex-
tracted from one of the real-world data logs is shown in Figure 
6.1. Observe from the figure that longer user sessions in the 
reference data are relatively rare, and their neighbors tend to 
be further away and outlier scores are higher. In Figure 5.3， 
S 8 J 8 S
 J e l o 
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outlier scores are calculated from normal user sessions collected 
by skipping Session Filter, and thus all the user sessions are not 
previously blocked. It is clear that the average outlier scores 
increase with the length of user access history. It is not fair 
to set a threshold to the outlier scores of different lengths alto-
gether. Our system is designed to perform anomaly detection in 






Figure 5.3: Outlier score distribution of raw user data at different lengths 
5.4.2 Characteristics of Anomaly Detection Modules 
Modules for short user sessions are able to reduce the number of 
requests more quickly compared to the other modules for longer 
user sessions, because abnormal user sessions can be blocked 
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On the other hand, modules for long user sessions are more ac-
curate and they can find out anomalies not detected previously, 
because the longer user access history provides more informa-
tion for determining whether a user is abnormal. Given these 
characteristics of the anomaly detection modules, the way to 
adjust the thresholds is described below. 
5.4.3 Dynamic Threshold Adaptation 
At the beginning, the thresholds [thi]Fp at various FP values 
are found (in Step 4) from the sorted outlier scores of known 
normal data. Initially, the maximum false positive rate allowed 
for all modules, FP*, is set to 0%. Besides, all the thresholds 
are set to infinity, as shown in Algorithm 2. 
The loading of Web server is then checked in an infinity loop, 
and routines for adjusting the thresholds are run according to 
the loading. When the server is overloaded, Algorithm 3 is run. 
Conversely, when it is underloaded, Algorithm 4 is run. Even-
tually, the loading keeps at a moderate level. 
In Algorithm 3 (Overloading), thw-i of is first in-
creased to [thw-i\FP*- It waits for a short period of time until 
the server loading to converge to a stable level. If the server is 
still overloaded, thw of the next module is increased to \thw\FP*, 
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Algorithm 2 Dynamic Threshold Adaptation 
/ / Compute the outlier scores at different FP 
for I = W-1 to E do 
for FP = 0% to 100% do 


















/ / Initialization 
FP* = 0%; 
next_to_update = W — 1; 
for I = W - 1 to E do 
thi <r- oo; //initialize the thresholds 
end for 
/ / Checking the server loading, and adjust the thresholds accordingly 
while true do 
if IsOverloaded() then 
Run Routine for Overloading; //Algorithm 3 
else if IsUnderloaded() then 
Run Routine for Underloading; //Algorithm 4 
end if 
end while 
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Algorithm 3 Routine for Overloading 
1： for I =next_to_update to E do 
2： thi <— [thi\FP*; 
3： next_to_update= /; 
4: WaitAWhile(); //wait for the loading to converge to a stable level 
5： if NOT IsOverloadedO then 
6： return ； //server is recovered from overloading 
7： end if 




// FP* is too low to protect the server 
FP* — FP* + FP_stepsize; 
Algorithm 4 Routine for Underloading 
// FP* is too high 
if FP* > 10% then 
FP* — FP* — FP_stepsize; 
end if 
/ / Update the thresholds 
for I = W - 1 to E do 
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and so on. If all the thresholds are increased to their corre-
sponding [thi]FP* but the server is still overloaded, FP* has to 
be released and set to a higher value. It is expected that the 
loading can be further reduced by sacrificing more normal users. 
The algorithm is repeated until the server is not overloaded. 
In Algorithm 4 (Underloading), threshold values are adjusted 
by a lower FP*, and more requests are allowed to pass through 
the modules. It is run when the server loading is below a pre-
defined level, the server is able to handle more requests, thus 
less requests should be blocked. The algorithm is run until the 
server is no longer underloaded. In addition, according to the 
new threshold levels, Outlier Collector can unblock some pre-
viously detected abnormal sessions, and thus some accidentally 
blocked normal users can be recovered. 
5.5 Chapter Summary 
In summary, this chapter describes the daily operation of the de-
fending system, and explains the design in Section 3.4 with more 
details. The preparation work and outlier score calculation for 
new coming requests are explained. Our analysis shows that it is 
beneficial to process user sessions with different anomaly detec-
tion modules depending on the lengths of sessions. In addition, 
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we describe the way to handle the detected abnormal user ses-
sions, as well as the routines for adjusting detection thresholds 
in order to maintain a stable server loading. 
• End of chapter. 
Chapter 6 
Experimental Results 
In this chapter, we present the experimental setup and simu-
lation results. In particular, the proposed system is evaluated 
by comparing its detection performance on both known normal 
data and simulated attack data. Besides, practical operational 
issues, for example guidelines for selecting the system param-
eters, are also discussed. The computation requirement of the 
system is also analyzed. 
6.1 Experiment Datasets 
In the experiments, normal Web access logs are collected from 
the publicly available Internet archive, while attack logs are sim-
ulated by our program. 
65 
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6.1.1 Normal Web Access Logs 
Several sets of real-world Web access logs are available at the 
Internet Traffic Archive [25]. In particular, we analyze the fol-
lowing three large sets of Web access logs: 
1. Saskatchewan-HTTP (UofS): 
All Web access logs on a W W W server of. the University of 
Saskatchewan during a period of seven months, from June 
to December in 1995. 
2. NASA-HTTP (NASA): All Web access logs on the NASA 
Kennedy Space Center W W W server in Florida during a 
period of two months, from July to August in 1995. 
3. ClarkNet-HTTP (Clarknet): All Web access logs on the 
ClarkNet W W W server during a period of two weeks. ClarkNet 
is an Internet access provider for the Metro Baltimore-
Washington DC area, from 28 August to 10 September in 
1995. 
Although the corresponding Web site structures of these data 
sets are not known, we construct the approximate site structures 
by assuming direct hyperlinks to exist between consecutive com-
monly accessed Web pages by users based on the server access 
logs. 
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The statistics of the data sets are summarized in Table 6.1. In 
particular, the average number of Web pages accessed per user 
session is around 3 only. The session length distribution of UofS 
in unit of number of Web page access is shown in Figure 6.1 as 
an example. In general, the session lengths fit some log-normal 
distribution [26 . 
Data Set UofS NASA Clarknet 
Duration of Trace 7 months 2 months 14 days 
Total Log Entries 1264889 676986 1004889 
User Sessions 437127 281459 306398 
Average Log Entries per day 6023 11283 71777 
Average User Sessions per day 2081 4690 21885 
Average Log Entries per User Session 2.9 2.4 3.3 
Average User Inter-Request Duration 136 sec 117 sec 111 sec 
Table 6.1: Statistics of the normal data sets 
All the access logs in these data sets are assumed to be con-
tributed by normal legitimate users only. Two different portions 
of user sessions with sizes specified in Section 6.3 are extracted 
to use as normal reference data for building Reference Profile 
and known normal data for testing the system. We denote the 
names of normal reference data by [dataset]^gy, while the names 
of known normal, data by [dataset]打ormaz，for example UofS^e/ 
and UofSnorma/ respectively. 
20 30 40 
Length of User Session 
60 
Figure 6.1: Length distribution of user sessions (UofS) 
6.1.2 Attack Data Generation 
The DDoS attack traffic for the experiments is generated by our 
own program. We try to simulate virtual attackers with best 
knowledge of an outsider as described in the following. 
As shown in Figure 6.2, the entry locations of normal users 
concentrate at about 30 locations. We assume that the ratio-
nal attackers are able to guess the top entry pages. Therefore, 
each virtual attacker is simulated to randomly pick one of the 
common entry locations as the starting point of its attack. 
Afterwards, the virtual attacker follows the hyperlinks of its 
currently accessed page to traverse the Web site randomly. Be-
tween each HTTP request, the virtual attacker waits for a short 
random period of time. In order to act like a human user, two 
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Figure 6.2: Entry access frequency of the top entry pages (UofS) 
probabilities pforward — 0.8 and Pbackward = 0.2 are set to define 
how likely the virtual attacker would go to the next page pointed 
by the hyperlinks (forward browsing) or go back to the previ-
ous page in its access history (backward browsing) respectively. 
In the case where there is no hyperlink in the page, backward 
browsing is performed too. Same as most Web browsers, HTTP 
request is not re-sent to the Web server in backward browsing 
as the page is retrieved from the local cache instead. 
We denote the names of simulated attack data by [datasetUtacfc: 
for example, Uo^Sattack' 
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Figure 6.3: Sorted outlier scores of the two testing data (normal and attack) 
The ROC curve is drawn by setting a varying threshold on 
the scores. For example, when the threshold is set to be around 
10, as shown by the horizontal dotted line, there are about 500 
users in UofSnormai that have scores above the threshold. Thus, 
500 out of 5000 normal users are mistakenly classified to be 
abnormal, and the corresponding false positive rate is ^ ^ = 
0.1. Similarly, about 1700 out of 5000 attackers are correctly 
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6.2 ROC Curve Construction 
The performance of our system is evaluated by ROC analysis, 
as described in 2.2.5. Below, we illustrate the way to draw a 
ROC curve. After Outlier Score Calculation described in Section 
5.3，two score distributions from VoiSattack and UofSnorma/ are 
obtained, as shown in Figure 6.3. . 
_ Attack Data' 
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Figure 6.4: An example of ROC graph 
6.3 System Parameters Selection 
Several parameters have to be set before running the anomaly 
detection system. The way to choose their values for optimizing 
the anomaly detection performance is described in the following. 
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classified to be abnormal, and the true positive rate is = 
0.34. Therefore, a point (FP, TP) = (0.1,0.34) is drawn on the 
ROC graph. By trying different threshold values, the full ROC 
curve can be obtained, as shown in Figure 6.4, while its AUG is 
about 0.88. 
a A S S O C J
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Size of Data Sets 
As mentioned in the Section 6.1，there are 3 types of data sets 
used in the experiments: normal reference data [dataset 
known normal data [dataset]•腿�and known attack data [dataset 
In general, the size of a data set has to be large enough for the 
data set to cover most of the normal or attack patterns. 
dataset]•匪z and [dataset]^ ^^^^^ are testing data injected to 
the system, and their sizes are not important to the system 
performance, but more testing data yields more accurate exper-
imental results. The sizes of these two data sets are chosen to be 
20,000, which is about the size of normal traffic in a few days, 
with reference to Table 6.1. 
The size of [dataset]^^^ has to be chosen to cover most of the 
normal user behavior. If it is too small, the anomaly detection 
will be inaccurate. Conversely, if it is too large, it takes much 
time to compute the outlier scores as shown in Section 6.5. The 
size of 5000 user sessions, which corresponds to a period of 1 to 
2 days, is used in the experiments. 
Rare Sub-sequence Filter 
The filter threshold F is defined as the percentage of occurrences 
of the rarest attributes to be filtered, with respect to the total 
refi 
Q f l 
attack ‘ 
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number of attribute occurrences. With reference to the docu-
ment analysis in [30], there are about 2.3 millions tokens in all 
the documents, and about 2 millions are remained after filter-
ing the rarely appeared token types. This means about 10% of 
occurrences of the rarest attributes are filtered. 
In Figure 6.5(a), the AUG values are the greatest at around 
F = 0.1，which agree with the filtering threshold above. How-
ever, the AUG values of Clarknetre/ attain the peak at F = 0.4. 
Indeed, the optimal filter threshold is related to the occurrence 
distribution of sub-sequences. Figure 6.5(b) shows the occur-
rences of the mostly appeared sub-sequences in term of per-
centage of total occurrences. It is clear that the occurrences 
of different sub-sequences in Clarknetre/ are more evenly dis-
tributed, compared to the other two data sets. In addition, 
Figure 6.5(c) shows the number of remaining sub-sequences af-
ter applying different filter thresholds. At low filter threshold F, 
the number of remaining sub-sequences drops rapidly in all the 3 
data sets. However, the decrease slows down at around F = 0.4 
for Clarknetre/，while it slows down at around F = 0.1 to 0.2 
for UofSre/ and N AS Are/. The three figures are consistent, and 
we can conclude that the optimal filter threshold is near to the 
turning point of the curve of remaining sub-sequences in Figure 
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 
(c) Number of Remaining Sub-Sequences at Different 
Filters Thresholds 
Figure 6.5: Graphs for finding the optimal filter threshold for rare sub-
sequences (W = 2) 
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(b) Occurrences of the Most Frequently Appeared 
Sub-Sequences (Percentage of Total Occurrences) 
CHAPTER 6. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 74 
0.4 0.5 
FHter Threshold 










s s u e n b a s i n s
 B u l e E a y
 节
















 ① d 
3 A 
Window Size 
Figure 6.6: Number of sub-Sequences appeared in UofSre/ 
The Window Size W is applied on user sequences for cutting 
them into sub-sequences. As discussed in Section 4.3.1，the num-
ber of ever-appeared user sub-sequences does not increase expo-
nentially with VK, because many of the {d + 1 )^ sub-sequences 
do not appear in-the data set which is of a limited size. It is 
illustrated in Figure 6.6, when W is too large, the number of 
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6.5(c). 
After filtering the rare sub-sequences, there are near a thou-
sand remained, thus it is still essential to use tools for dimension 
reduction, like diffusion wavelets, to process the data before the 
outlier score calculation. 
Sliding Window Size 
• Without Filtering 
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ever-appeared sub-sequences is actually decreasing. 
76 
Figure 6.7: AUG at different sliding window size (UofS) 
When W is large, the sub-sequences found in reference data 
are too specific that it is difficult to find a match even in known 
normal testing data. Therefore, most of the sub-sequences in 
testing data are classified as rare sub-sequence sub RARE- This 
hurts the anomaly detection performance, as shown in Figure 
6.7, because both of the testing data mostly consist of 
and appear to be similar. 
In short, sub-sequences with larger W describe user sequences 
more precisely, but this is too fine-grained that the reference 
data and testing data are described by two different sets of sub-
sequences, and thus they are not comparable. But, at the op-
posite extreme, sub-sequences with W = 1 lose all sequential 
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information. Therefore, the window size is chosen to be = 2 
in the experiments. 
Hash Output Size 
The hash function randomly combines the sub-sequences in or-
der to limit the maximum number of features, thus the dimen-
sions, of the data. However, at the same time, hashing reduces 
the amount of information irreversibly, and hurts the anomaly 
detection performance as shown in Figure 6.8. Therefore, the 
200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 
Hash Output Size 
Figure 6.8: AUG at different hash output size (UofS; 1489 sub-sequences 
after filtering) 
hash output size m should be set large provided that the memory 
size is large enough for running diffusion wavelets, as described 
in Section 6.5. In this experiment, the 4GB memory is enough 
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to compute diffusion wavelets with about 6000-dimensional in-
put data, and m is set to be 6000, where the hashing is simply 
skipped in many cases when the number of sub-sequences is less 
than 6000. 
Diffusion Wavelets Level 
Diffusion wavelets helps to reduce the dimensions of feature 
spaces, and improves the anomaly detection performance. In 
Figure 6.9, anomaly detection performs the best at level 6, in 
most of the cases. At level 6, the number of dimensions is re-
duced to about 60 for UofS, as shown in Figure 6.10. 
However, since AUG is not reduced much, it is also reason-
able to pick higher levels because the number of dimensions is 
further reduced and this helps to shorten the time for outlier 
score calculation. 
Number of Nearest Neighbors k NN 
In /civAT-nearest neighbor algorithms, the value of kjsfN is referred 
as a smoothing parameter in predicting outliers. In Figure 6.11, 
the experimental results agree with those stated in [15] that a 
large value of kj^ N results in a small variance in the distribution 
of outlier scores, while a small value of / c a t a t makes the algorithm 
Diffusion Wavelets Level 
Figure 6.9: AUG at different diffusion wavelets levels (UofS) 
unable to tolerate the noise in reference data. 
Therefore, a suitable value of k^^ has to be chosen. There 
are sophisticated methods [14] for choosing the value of kNN, but 
it is found in the experiments that kjsfN does not significantly 
affect the performance of anomaly detection. 
It is assumed that for each particular type of normal users, 
there is at least an appearance out of any 500 user sessions in 
reference data. Therefore, Rnn is set to be • of the size of 
reference data set. 
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Figure 6.10: Dimension after applying diffusion wavelets at different levels 
Settings for Anomaly Detection Modules 
In the experiments, the number of anomaly detection modules 
is set to 5, i.e. E - W 2 = 5 and E = b when VK = 2, so 
that the system investigates the first 5 access requests from each 
user sessions. After the first 5 requests, all incoming requests 
are directly forwarded to the Web server. It is shown in Section 
6.4 that 5 modules are enough for detecting most of the attacks. 
For each module MOD/, the threshold thi is initially set to 
zero and eventually increases when the Web server is overloaded, 
as described in Section 5.4.3. The maximum threshold bound 
th广 is initially set to the corresponding value when FP = 10% 
for a piece of known normal data for calibration. It can be found 
—UofS(F=0 .1 ) 
,1 NASA (F=0.1) 
-Clarknet (F=0.4) 
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Figure 6.11: Normalized outlier scores at different value of /c^ vyv in UofSattacfc 
from the sorted outlier scores, for example in Figure 6.3. 
Summary of System Parameter Values Selected 
1. Sizes of [dataset]re,，[dataset]•誰；and [dataset]^^^^^；^ are 
5000, 20000 and 20000 user sessions respectively. 
2. Rare sub-sequence filter F for UofS, NASA and Clarknet 
are 0.1, 0.1 and 0.4 respectively. 
3. Sub-sequence window size W is 2. 
4. Hash output size is 6000, which is large enough that has no 
effect to the data sets in our experiments. 
5. Diffusion Wavelets Level is 6, where the dimensions of the 
reduced space is about 100. 
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6. Number of nearest neighbors k^N for calculating outlier 
scores is • of the size of reference data set, which is 10. 
7. Number of anomaly detection modules is 5，where E = b 
when W = 2. 
8. Threshold at MOD/, thi, is initially set to zero, while the 
maximum threshold bound 力 广 is set to the corresponding 
value when FP = 10%. 
6.4 Performance of Anomaly Detection 
In the experiments, virtual normal users and virtual attack-
ers are simulated in a way that they continuously send ac-
cess requests to the system, according to [ d a t a s e t ] 灿 a n d 
dataset]她acfc. In addition, a set of attack data "Random At-
tack" is used as a reference, in which the attackers randomly 
access to a specific set of Web pages. 
In order to compare the anomaly detection modules fairly, 
all the lengths of request sequences are fixed to be the number 
of modules, i.e. rii = 5, so all the users have a chance to be 
evaluated by every module if they are not eventually blocked. 
The threshold thi of each module MOD/ is set to be thJ^ax, such 
that the false positive rate at each module is limited to be about 
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10%. 
As mentioned in Section 6.3, there are 20,000 normal users 
and 20,000 attackers, and each of them sends 5 requests, thus 
200,000 requests in total. The number of successful requests, 
namely those passed the anomaly detection, in each module is 
recorded and shown in Figure 6.12 and Table 6.2. For those 
users who cannot pass the previous module, they are blocked and 
their upcoming requests not able to be evaluated by the other 
modules. Therefore, the curves in the graphs are monotonically 
decreasing. 
Data Set 
Anomaly Detection Module Total 
Passed 
Percentage of 
Total Requests MODi MOD2 MOD3 MOD4 MOD5 
U ofSjiormai 17908 15992 14236 12690 11298 72124 72.1% 
UofSa^ocfc 17266 5192 3546 3246 1980 31230 31.2% 
NASAnormal 18224 16266 14494 12968 11544 73496 73.5% 
NASAattack 15404 5898 1932 1176 808 25218 25.2% 
Clarknet 打 ormaZ 18484 16832 14988 13354 11938 75596 75.6% 
Claikneiattack 18044 9618 6494 4452 3796 42404 42.4% 
Table 6.2: The number of passed user sessions in each anomaly detection 
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6.4.1 Performance Analysis 
If a baseline strategy of random dropping is used, the 3 curves in 
Figure 6.12 will be overlapping, since each request has the same 
probability to be dropped. Therefore, the vertical gaps between 
the normal curve and the other ones show the differentiation 
power of our system to that particular type of attack. It is 
shown that the curves for "Random Attack" are below those for 
dataset]_c/e, which means the requests of "Random Attack" 
can be detected by our system more easily. It is reasonable 
because random attacks are less sophisticated and more different 
from the normal users. 
The statistics in Table 6.2 provide information about the per-
formance of anomaly detection in each individual module, which 
is summarized in Table 6.3. It is consistent with the ROC curves 
of each module, as shown in Figure 6.13 as an example. In 
particular, false positive rate FP and true negative rate TN 
are respectively the percentage of known normal requests de-
tected to be abnormal mistakenly and normal correctly. On the 
other hand, true positive rate TP and false negative rate FN 
are respectively the percentage of known abnormal requests de-
tected to be abnormal correctly and normal mistakenly. A well-
performed system should have low FP and high TP. 
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Data Set 
Anomaly Detection Module 
MODi MOD2 MOD3 MOD4 MOD5 
UofS 
FP 11% 11% 11% 11% 11% 
TP 13.7% 70% 31.7% 8.5% 39% 
NASA 
FP 9% 11% 11% 11% 11% 
TP 23% 61.7% 67.2% 39.1% 31.5% 
Clarknet 
FP 8% 9% 11% 11% 11% 
TP 9.8% 46.7% 32.5% 31:5% 14.7% 
Table 6.3: Anomaly detection performance of individual module; Compared 
to TP = FP in random dropping 
As shown in Table 6.3，TP is higher than FP in most of 
the cases. Therefore, our system works better than random 
dropping, where TP = FP as mentioned in Section 2.2.5. 
TP is relatively low in MODi because both normal users and 
simulated attackers pick the common entries as their first step. 
In that case, all the users appear to be similar in the module 
and it is difficult to differentiate between them. In practice, oc-
currences of the common entries for normal users are not evenly 
distributed, while the simulated attackers select the common en-
tries randomly (uniform distribution). This difference accounts 
for the higher TP than FP in MODi. 
On the other hand, TP decreases from MOD2 to MOD5 be-
cause easy-to-detect attacks are already filtered in the previous 
0.2 0.4 0.5 0.6 
False Positive 
0.7 0.8 0.9 
Figure 6.13: ROC curves for NASA data set at different modules 
modules, the remaining ones, even with extra traversal informa-
tion, are more difficult to be detected. 
6.4.2 Performance in defending DDoS attacks 
The above experiment only considers requests processed by the 
modules, and the real performance of the whole system is not 
revealed. It is because some requests are filtered by Session 
Filter at the front line, and some returning requests with long 
enough normal history are sent directly to Web server without 
going through the modules. 
In general, compromised hosts involved in a DDoS attack is 
CHAPTER 6. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 87 
丨函 
f-
CHAPTER 6. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 88 
much more than the normal users, and have much longer request 
sequences. Let Na be the number of compromised hosts, and N^ 
be the number of normal users. Let Na be r times larger than 
Nu, Na = 丁Nu. Besides, assume the compromised hosts and 
normal users send out requests with a fixed length of la and lu 
respectively. 
Request Type Number of Hosts 
Number of Requests 
per Host Total 
Normal Users Nu =20,000 lu =5 100,000 
Compromised Hosts Na =200,000 la =100 20,000,000 
Table 6.4: Summary of a typical DDoS attack 
As summarized in Table 6.4, we assume the statistics for 
dataset]恥rmd remain unchanged, i.e. Nu = 20,000 and lu = 5. 
However, the compromised hosts and their requests are much 
more, in particular, we take r = 10, s.t. Na = 200,000, and 
la = 100. The total numbers of normal and DDoS requests are 
respectively, 
Nu X lu = 100,000 and Na x la = 20,000,000 
The number of (mistakenly) passed DDoS requests can be cal-
culated by 
5 . I la 5 
PASSa = n J] i^-TPmod)) 
1=1 mod=l =6 mod—] 
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where TPmod is the true positive rate of module mod. The first 
term corresponds to the passed requests at the modules. The 
other term corresponds to those passed directly to Web server 
since they have passed all the modules before. Similarly, the 
number of (correctly) passed requests from normal users can be 
calculated by 
5 I In ‘ 5 
passu=YSNU n ( 1 - 仲 n ( 1 -仲-⑷ 
/=1 mod=l 1=6 mod=l 
where FPmod is the false positive rate of module mod. There-
fore, the percentage of dropped DDoS and normal requests are 
respectively 
^ 1 PASSn 
dropa = 1 -
and 
dropu = 1 -
Na X la 
PASSu 
Nu X lu 
where drop a indicates the practical degree of protection against 
DDoS attacks and dropu the degree of influence to normal users. 
Take UofS as an example, the number passed requests are 
listed in Table 6.5. The row "Accumulative Pass %" is the pass 
rate all the way from MODi to the corresponding module of the 
column. On the row "Passed Requests", the columns of Request 
Order to correspond to first term (passed at the 5 mod-
ules) in PASS a and PASSu, while "all afterwards" corresponds 
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to the second term (passed directly to Web server). It is notable 
that the rate (55.8%) for normal access under "all afterwards" 




2nd 3rd 4th 5认 afterward 
DDoS Attack 
Accumulative Pass % 86.3% 25.9% 17.7% •16.2% 9.9% 9.9% 
Passed Requests 172600 51780 35366 32360 19739 1875242 
Normal Access 
Accumulative Pass % 89% 79.2% 70.5% .62.7% 55.8% 55.8% 
Passed Requests 17800 15842 14099 12548 11168 0 
Table 6.5: Number of requests passed to Web server for both DDoS attack 
and normal user access 
By Summing up the rows of Passed Requests, the practical 
performance of the system in defending against DDoS attacks 
can be calculated, 
2187087 
PASSa = 2187087 and dropa = 1 一 
PASSu 二 71457 and dropu = 1 -




20000 X 5 
In particular, the total number of requests reaching to Web 
server is reduced from 20,100,000 to 2,258,544 (reduced 88.8%), 
which is a significant reduction and prevents the server from 
overloading. Besides, the ratio of number of request arrivals is 
Number of DDoS request arrivals _ 20000000 
Number of normal request arrivals 100000 = 2 0 0 : 1 
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and after filtering abnormal ones by our system, the ratio of 
number of requests passed to the Web server becomes 
Number of passed DDoS requests — 2187087 
OVj : 丄 
Number of passed normal requests 71457 
This means our system is able to increase the portion of normal 
requests passed to the Web server by approximately 7 folds. 
Compared to [20], where the sequential information is ignored 
and dimension reduction is not performed, the ratio could be 
reduced to approximately 60:1 (3.3 folds) only. 
Consider a situation when the server is overloaded that it can 
only serve 11.2% of the incoming requests (about 900% loaded), 
and equivalently the percentage of requests dropped is 88.8%. 
In Table 6.6, the performance of our system is compared to that 
of the baseline strategy of random dropping. 71.5% of normal 
requests are passed in our system, compared to 11.2% in ran-
domly dropping. This shows that our system can effectively 
reduce the server loading by sacrificing a smaller amount of nor-
mal requests. 
6.5 Computation Requirement 
The experiments are executed on a workstation with 2.4GHz 
CPU and 4GB RAM. The time and memory requirement for 
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Scheme 
Passed Requests 
Normal DDoS Total 
Our System 71.5% 10.3% 11.2% 
Random Dropping 11.2% 11.2% 11.2% 
Table 6.6: Amount of different types of requests passed in our system and 
random dropping 
reference profile construction and real-time anomaly detection 
are discussed in the following. 
Offline Reference Profile Construction 
Reference profile construction is done offline and periodically, 
so its time requirement does not affect the throughput of our 
system. Time requirement for Reference Profile Construction, 
except the basis computation in diffusion wavelets, is usually 
short and negligible. For example, time requirement for sub-
sequence extraction by sliding window and hashing is linear to 
the lengths of user sessions, i.e. the number of log entries in 
the sessions. In addition, dimension reduction is done by linear 
multiplication of the feature vectors and diffusion wavelets basis, 
and its time requirement is 0 ( s ) for s unique sub-sequences. 
The time requirement of diffusion wavelets is log^ n) in 
theory, where n is the number of input dimensions [6]. As shown 
in Table 6.7, it takes several minutes to compute the bases in 




Diffusion Wavelets Computation (till Level 6) 
Input Dimension Time (sec) Memory (MB) Footprint of result (MB) 
UofS (F = 0.1) 1490 470 332 24 
NASA (F = 0.1) 1839 947 572 45 
Clarknet (F = 0.4) 973 280 179 10 
Table 6.7: Time and memory requirement for diffusion wavelets computation 
Real-time Anomaly Detection 
In Data Preparation, the time requirement is similar to that in 
Reference Profile Construction, and it is usually short and negli-
gible. The bottleneck of throughput in our system is the outlier 
score calculation in most cases, and throughput statistics in the 
experiments is listed in the "Tests/sec" column of Table 6.8. In 
our experiments, the program ORCA from [1] is used for out-
lier score calculation. The memory footprint remains constant 
because samples are read in sequentially from the disk and no 
caching is performed, while the time requirement for each query 
is 0(kref . dim), where kref is number of reference data points. 
The time requirement of ORCA is the same as that of nested 
loops (brute-force) method. However, it can be improved by 
using other sophisticated nearest neighbor algorithms, as de-
scribed in Section 2.2.4. The nearest neighbor algorithm can 
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be substituted by other outlier score algorithms with less time 
requirement. In that case, the throughput of our system would 
be much better than the experimental results. 
Data Set 
Outlier Score Computation (5000 reference points) 
Dimension Memory (MB) time(ms)/request Throughput (requests/sec) 
UofS 61 6 1.62 615 
NASA 23 6 0.63 . 1587 
Clarknet 116 6 2.95 339 
Table 6.8: Time and memory requirement for outlier score computation (5000 
reference points and 20000 testing points) 
Practically, a non-blocking anomaly detection system can be 
implemented to release the limitation of throughput due to out-
lier score calculation. In this case, the system does not wait for 
the completion of anomaly detection before determining where 
the incoming requests should be forwarded to. If the anomaly 
detection takes too long to complete, the corresponding sessions 
are treated as normal temporarily and their requests are for-
warded to the Web server. When the anomaly detection is 
completed and those abnormal sessions are identified, further 
requests from those sessions are blocked in the future. This 
approach is workable because it can still block the abnormal 
sessions eventually, although a small amount of requests are es-
caped when the non-blocking anomaly detection is running. 
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6.6 Chapter Summary 
In Summary, it is demonstrated in this chapter that the per-
formance of the proposed system in defending DDoS attacks. 
It first described the ways to choose the parameters of the sys-
tem. Afterwards, real-world data sets of Web access logs and 
self-generated sets of DDoS attack logs are injected into the sys-
tem, while the defending power is summarized and explained. 
It is illustrated that the system is able to filter out most of the 
DDoS requests. Finally, the computation requirement of diffu-
sion wavelets and outlier score computation are described. 
• End of chapter. 
Chapter 
Conclusion and Future Work 
In this thesis, we have proposed a real-time anomaly detection 
system for defending HTTP flooding DDoS attacks. The system 
is a host-based system and it is able to use knowledge about the 
user behavior, which is only known at the server side, to identify 
the attack traffic. It targets at detecting sophisticated DDoS at-
tacks where attackers try to generate traffic very similar to the 
normal ones. We have presented the way to process Web ac-
cess logs and embed them in a feature space of much reduced 
dimension using diffusion wavelets. In addition, the design of 
the real-time detection system and its daily operation flow are 
described in detail. We also provide guidelines to choose sys-
tem parameters for optimizing the detection performance. We 
demonstrate via simulation experiments using real-world Web 
access logs that the proposed system can filter out about 90% 
96 
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of DDoS requests by sacrificing about 30% of normal requests, 
even when the offered load from the attackers is 200 times of 
that of legitimate users. 
Future Work 
In addition to page access sequences of Web users, the time 
durations spent on each specific Web page are also useful infor-
mation for anomaly detection. It is because the time durations 
for different path traversals are only known by the Web server 
administrator, and this may help to identify attackers. In par-
ticular, the time durations for normal users fit some exponential 
distribution [26] and are mostly short, while those in DDoS at-
tacks are also typically short. Although both of the durations 
are short on the whole, the distributions for normal users at 
different path traversals vary. By investigating the time dis-
tribution for each sub-sequence in the reference data, one can 
further divide it into several time-dependent sub-sequences. For 
example, compared to the time distribution of the sub-sequence 
sub in reference data, instances of sub with short, normal and 
long time durations can be represented by subshort^  subnormal and 
sub\ong respectively. In that case, the feature set for represent-
ing user sessions' is expanded by 3 times, but with the help of 
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diffusion wavelets, the set can still be automatically reduced to 
a manageable size. It is believed that the performance of our 
system can be improved by including this piece of information. 
• End of chapter. 
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